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introduCtion
Haji Idris of Sungai Banjar came from South 
Sulawesi with his wife and three children to the 
Mahakam Delta in East Kalimantan in 1997.1 
Idris began to work for a local pond owner, and 
within two years a local businessperson and the 
pond owner trusted him to operate ten hectares 
of ponds near Sungai Banjar. At the time, the 
number of ponds in the region was growing rap-
idly as profits were mounting. Idris built a large 
house in Sungai Banjar, which he furnished 
nicely with an impressive set of couches and 
two tall cabinets filled with porcelain. After some 
time, Idris managed to collect big harvests and 
he and his family cashed large sums of money. 
They saved a part of it and went on pilgrimage 
to Mecca three times in a period of five years. 
Since 2003, harvests began to decrease and 
by now Idris is unable to collect shrimps any 
more. He now fishes small shrimp, which he and 
wife dry on the jetty in front of their house. They 
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sell the dry shrimp to buyers from the nearby 
town of Samarinda. It is hard for them to make 
ends meet and at the same time they face a sig-
nificant debt (about IDR50 million or AUD$6,100) 
with the punggawa (patrons) who  are no longer 
willing to give loans. This is how Idris expresses 
his concern:
There is almost no hope. We don’t know 
what to expect. We have no money to go 
elsewhere so we try to survive here. We still 
eat but we’re not sure about tomorrow. The 
government should come and see how we 
live, how we suffer. They should teach us 
about what to do. It would be great if Total 
[Total E&P Indonesia, a sizeable oil and 
gas industry active in the region]2 is going 
to compensate the land that I own [tanah 
milik saya] so I can use that cash to pay 
off my debts and move to another coastal 
region. It seems they are not going to com-
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pensate us for the pollution that killed 
the ponds. That is not fair. But they 
come to listen and they gave assistance 
to the mosque and they are funding the 
rehab of our school. The government is 
not at all listening. Not sure what is all 
behind that. Alas, the little people do not 
have power. (Interview with Idris (42), 
Sungai Banjar, 10 June 2008)
A growing number of Bugis shrimp 
farmers in the delta of the Mahakam River 
experience injustices with respect to limited 
redress from the oil and gas industry by 
Total E&P Indonesia (henceforth: Total) and 
the government. The redress sought relates 
to declining or even loss of shrimp produce 
that people link to environmental changes 
allegedly caused by the activities of Total. The 
social, economic and cultural background 
of these injustices and the grievances that 
they have evoked are identified in this paper. 
I will show how local livelihoods of shrimp 
farmers who work within a patron–client 
system have become increasingly linked to 
large-scale resource exploitation and, as 
also indicated in the quote from Idris, hope 
that the government might provide justice. 
Since the end of President Suharto’s New 
Order regime in 1998, the Indonesian state 
and society are experiencing the devolution 
of central power and concurrent increases 
in regional autonomy with its own political 
dynamics (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 
2007). One would expect that a region like 
the Mahakam Delta would by now fully fall 
under autonomous regulations promulgated 
by the province of East Kalimantan, and that 
local Bugis elites would have significant con-
trol over state governance. While Bugis elites 
are powerful in provincial politics, Bugis in 
the Mahakam Delta enjoy a different form of 
autonomy — a frontier culture that is hardly 
controlled by the state but relates to the state 
in a different way. 
People in the delta are generally not keen 
to engage with the government and they do not 
respond to the greater autonomy afforded by 
Indonesia’s new political constellation. In this 
sense, they do not fit in the kind of situation 
that is addressed by Indonesia watchers such 
as John McCarthy and Carol Warren (2009), 
who appraise the prospects for more equitable 
and more sustainable models of governance. 
Bugis evade the state systematically unless 
there is a demand for justice to which some 
kind of state procedure is mandatory. 
The ways in which the Bugis patrons in 
the Mahakam Delta relate to the state illus-
trates the argument by James Scott in his 
book The Art of Not Being Governed: An 
Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia 
(2009). Scott’s is an area study that focuses 
on the periphery of nine Asian states in which 
numerous peoples are not fully incorporated 
into nation-states. He sees that these
hill peoples are best understood as run-
away, fugitive, maroon communities who 
have, over the course of two millennia, 
been fleeing the oppressions of state-
making projects in the valleys — slav-
ery, conscription, taxes, corvée labor, 
epidemics, and warfare (Scott 2009:ix) 
Generally, the livelihoods, social organisa-
tion, ideologies and their largely oral cultures 
are mostly read in terms of weapons of the 
weak, ‘designed to keep the state at arm’s 
length’ (2009: x). Scott argues, however, that 
‘for those living in the shadow of states, such 
evasion is perfectly compatible with deriva-
tive, imitative, and parasitic state forms in the 
hills’ (2009:x). 
The argument that Scott puts forward is 
counter-intuitive yet works for understanding 
the case discussed in this paper.
My research among Bugis shrimp farm-
ers in East Kalimantan indicates that much 
of their culture, in particular those of the 
patrons who keep in place a patron–cli-
ent system, is an adaptation designed to 
evade both state capture and state forma-
tion. These Bugis see the state as attractive, 
and patrons in particular mimic elements of 
the state to legitimise their position and to 
facilitate access to the waters and lands of 
the delta, to exploit the shrimp ponds, and 
to engage in trade with shrimp buyers. As a 
result, they enjoy a great deal of sovereignty. 
Most patrons in the Mahakam Delta present 
themselves as the state in terms of provid-
ing money and welfare to their clients. They 
suggest to their clients that they are the only 
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reliable state as the other state is uncertain 
due to unclear and ever-changing plans and 
programs and its own interest in terms of 
subordination and taxation. 
The other elite in the delta are the Bugis 
who represent the village-level government. 
The village heads, in much the same way 
as patrons, like to be seen as a state, while 
they are also keen to steer safe from the 
state unless it provides funds for projects. 
For these purposes, they mimic the state 
at the local level. Physically, attempts are 
also made to mimic the ‘magic’ of the state. 
The village heads’ tidy offices have desks 
and filing cabinets like in real government 
offices, with clear signs indicating func-
tions and department, for example financial 
officer, planning officer, first secretary, and 
so on. The jetty in front of these offices 
often has curbs painted with black and 
white stripes imitating government offices in 
towns and cities. This copying of the state 
has, however, hardly any power, and most 
of their ‘subjects’ laugh at the rhetoric on 
strict regime, effective law enforcement, and 
smooth bureaucracy.
From the point of view of the clients or 
subjects, the state and the company have 
become immediately important for access-
ing compensation monies. While the Indo-
nesian government outside their realm in 
the delta holds little attraction for them, they 
are inclined to see the state as a provider of 
justice, as an alternative system to the one 
that subjects them. They need this alterna-
tive system to get access to compensation 
with the idea that large amounts of cash will 
give them more control over resources. They 
are, like their patrons, keen to avoid all the 
evil that they see in wider Indonesian society: 
drudgery, subordination, and immobility. 
The tension between the patrons and the 
clients partly illustrates Scott’s thesis and 
shows that the Bugis elite controls the local 
economy on the basis of patronage, that 
they appreciate a high level of sovereignty to 
safeguard themselves from that system by 
mimicking that system, but that the clients are 
keen to engage with the state by using it to 
get access to compensation payments by the 
company. The position of the clients is illus-
trated in this quote from one of my interviews:
Look, you know the delta. This is a place 
with no government regulations and 
in which the company acts arbitrarily, 
and where the people are legally illiter-
ate [buta hukum]. When the investors 
[migrants] came and opened ponds 
there was no sharing and there was 
no control whatsoever. Since 2002, 
the fishery department says that the 
ponds we have made in the past are no 
good. What’s that? For ages they told 
us that they should be devoid of any 
form of vegetation. Now they are sup-
posed to be green. Should we oppose 
that? Those who still believe in ponds 
plant mangroves, get some money for it 
from the government and hope that the 
green pond will produce good harvests. 
There is no protest. People are in debt 
and feel they can’t demand anything 
as long as they owe millions of rupiahs 
to someone else. Shame! People can’t 
be free in the delta. People are slaves 
[budak]. It’s the punggawa [patrons]. 
The government does not realise that 
by being absent they actually allow the 
colonisation of a whole group of people 
who as a result become vulnerable. He 
does not think like a leader. He is not 
a leader. The government has the guts 
to govern, but it does not dare to take 
responsibility. We, the people, have little 
knowledge. We just enjoy the things that 
we can still enjoy here while not being 
concerned about the future. The govern-
ment behaves like a king [raja]. They 
bring security guards when they visit us. 
Allah knows what kind of system that 
is. What are we, who are we, what can 
we do, what should we stand for? They 
don’t help us to answer those questions.
(Pak Amir, Sungai Banjar, February 11, 2009)
While the Bugis patrons in the Mahakam 
Delta successfully keep the state at bay and 
operate as shrimp producers with a high level 
of sovereignty, the state does see the delta 
as a useful territory. It has given the area in 
concession to Total from which it reaps tax 
payments. For the extraction of oil and gas, 
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neither the state nor Total need to firmly 
control this ungoverned region as long as 
the Bugis shrimp farmers do not obstruct the 
operations. Most Bugis see Total as another 
frontier actor, as a sovereign body who is 
working hard to grab resources. This reflec-
tion on Total informs much of the way in which 
Bugis conceptualise their right to access com-
pensation payments from the company. 
To show how the Bugis’s art of not 
being governed informs their ideas about 
compensation, this paper will discuss the 
frontier culture and Bugis’s self-identification 
as sovereign and not belonging to the state, 
while at the same time being the state for 
their own subjects. I also include an overview 
and analysis of the role of the government 
to show that by systematically neglecting 
the Mahakam Delta in terms of planning and 
regulation, it allowed this frontier culture to 
evolve and protract. The government failed 
to develop and implement clear policies that 
could have fostered an environmentally more 
sustainable and socially more just future for 
the people of the Mahakam Delta. 
Below, I will identify these perceptions 
of injustices and situate them in the Bugis 
culture of sovereignty and people’s relations 
with the state. This paper is of particular 
importance for policy making on the issue of 
access to justice in the aquaculture frontiers 
of Indonesia. These frontiers are often areas 
where people master the art of not being 
governed and as such should receive specific 
policy attention. Moreover, the sheer scale of 
these frontiers in most of Southeast Asia, and 
the human problems involved warrants for 
specific policies. For policy advice purposes, 
the legal analysis in the section of this paper 
‘Claiming compensation for the declining 
shrimp harvests’ is a good starting point.
Compensation
It is in the situation sketched above that peo-
ple increasingly seek compensation from the 
company. As mentioned earlier, Bugis tend 
to see the company as a potentially equal 
partner in a frontier of opportunities but pain-
fully realise that it is an unequal competitor 
and a source of compensation monies. Since 
the production of shrimp began to decline, 
discourse around environmental damage 
ensued. This, however, does not mean that 
the issue is solely environmental or ecologi-
cal. This is because people are fundamen-
tally concerned with control over resources 
and the control sought is expressed in terms 
of relationships. As Stuart Kirsch (2006: 
79–106) points out with respect to the impact 
of the Ok Tedi mine in the Upper Fly-Digul 
Plateau of Papua New Guinea, Yonggom 
people accusing the company of being a sor-
cerer inflicting harm should be seen in terms 
of their relations with the mine. 
The resulting compensation claims 
show how pollution should be seen 
as a social relationship rather than an 
environmental problem that can only be 
addressed by technical means (Kirsch 
2006:106). 
The case of the Bugis and Total examined 
in this paper is also best understood when 
grounded in the fundamental aspect of social 
relations within the region. Glenn Banks 
(2002) eloquently sets the agenda for such 
an approach in a comparative analysis of the 
explanations of conflicts generated by the 
Ok Tedi, Panguna and Freeport mine sites 
in Melanesia. It allows for the incorporation 
of subsistence resources derived from the 
natural environment (such as the shrimp pro-
duction in East Kalimantan), as well as other 
socially and culturally constructed resources 
(such as the patron–client system among 
Bugis and Bugis migrant’s emphasis on 
autonomy) (Banks 2002: 41). The greatest 
value of the approach proposed by Banks is 
that it replaces frameworks that solely focus 
on an ‘ecological crisis’ and that it allows for 
recognition that the environmental impacts 
of the mines have created the possibilities 
for accessing justice by tapping into political, 
legal, and media resources. ‘In this sense 
community complaints over environmental 
issues may be symptomatic of wider prob-
lems’ (Banks 2002:42). 
As I will show below, certain groups in 
the Mahakam Delta are keen to access com-
pensation payments by Total by framing their 
problems as environmental, in tune with the 
language of their lawyers and NGO advisors, 
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because it will be heard by the company. The 
wider problems faced by these people are, 
however, about degrading ponds, reducing 
shrimp catches, low shrimp prices, massive 
debts with their patrons, and unrequited 
reciprocity with the company. On top of that, 
there is a sense of limited control over 
resources (patrons own the land and have 
control over collection and sales of shrimp), 
and loss of direction in their lives (as only 
those with funds can invest in a new region). 
The presence of Total and the environ-
mental impact (whether real or alleged) of 
its operations impinge further on people’s 
already limited security over their resources. 
Some see themselves as victims of allegedly 
toxic gas leaks from pipes of Total installa-
tions (as I detail below) particularly if it opens 
an avenue to compensation payments. This 
also explains that in their discourse about 
pollution Bugis in the Mahakam Delta link 
Total’s evils to the end of their autonomy 
(and concurrent growing interest in linking 
with the government) and the ordeal of mov-
ing on to a new region and starting anew as 
opportunistic migrants, which is a costly and 
uncertain venture. 
a Frontier eConomy
To understand the situation in the Mahakam 
Delta, it is important to see the region as a 
‘frontier economy’. It is a region of opportu-
nity, where previously intractable mangrove 
has been turned into privately owned land 
albeit without official consent of the state 
that formally claims the whole delta as state 
land (apart from a few plots for which people 
hold official land certificates). Bugis pioneers 
arriving from regions where their freedom of 
movement and residence became restricted, 
ventured into this land considering it as open 
access, as common property, where they 
could be self-reliant by growing shrimp in 
ponds. Each arriving family or group had its 
own independent access to land and waters 
for building shrimp ponds. Right from the 
beginning of shrimp farming in the Mahakam 
Delta, an ethos of independence began to 
underpin the frontier culture. 
The newcomers were attracted to the 
region because of the potential of aquacul-
ture, especially when US dollar-related export 
prices for shrimps increased sharply due to 
the drastic devaluation of the Indonesian 
rupiah during the Asian financial crisis that hit 
the region in 1997 and lingered through 1998. 
In particular, those who felt marginalised in 
their Bugis homelands in South Sulawesi 
because of growing pressure on land and 
other resources, sold their land and houses 
and tried their luck in East Kalimantan. They 
invested cash and manpower to clear veg-
etation and to construct ponds, mostly of two 
hectares in size but sometimes up to hundred 
hectares.
After they cleared the mangrove and 
established signs indicating the borders of 
the land claimed, the migrants would arrange 
a new Civil Registration Card (Kartu Tanda 
Penduduk) and next a so-called segel or 
izin garap (a permit ‘to till’, ‘to cultivate’ or ‘to 
work on’ the land) from the most accessible 
village head (Kepala Desa) or head of the 
village neighbourhood or hamlet or sub-
village (Bapak Rukun Tetangga). Next they 
hired an excavator for digging the ponds, 
purchased baby shrimp (benur) and fertilis-
ers, constructed a dwelling at the pond, and 
recruited pond workers. Over a period of two 
decades, more than half of the landmass of 
the delta was converted into shrimp ponds.
To harvest a quality product, the pond 
needs acceptable water quality — something 
that is hard to maintain in the delta due to 
improper water management and salination 
of the soil. There is also significant competi-
tion for the natural food in the pond. Many 
farms are concentrated in a small area in the 
delta and this, along with the other factors 
mentioned above, have a negative effect on 
the environment and reduce pond productiv-
ity. Shrimp diseases have also entered the 
ponds as a consequence of the use of the 
commercial feedstuffs used to speed up 
growth rates. These produce large amounts 
of waste and fertile conditions for the growth 
of viral and bacterial shrimp diseases. Pollu-
tion of the waters — due to a combination of 
the oil and gas industry, upstream deforesta-
tion, and the local use of feedstuffs — has 
also contributed to the decreases in harvests.
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The evolving social and economic rela-
tionships are typical of the contemporary 
migrant Bugis patron–client system. It 
involves seemingly unconstrained exploit-
ation facilitated by inequitable profit sharing, 
and belongs to a tradition that is foreign to 
the region but is typical of contemporary 
Bugis (see Timmer 2010). In line with Chris-
tian Pelras’s (2000) descriptions, scholars 
see other current manifestations of Bugis 
patron–client systems primarily as examples 
of the effects of modern capitalism. Studies 
report changes in ‘traditional’ patron–client 
systems not only in the Bugis South Sulawesi 
heartland but also in migrant communities 
elsewhere. In general, these groups experi-
ence shifts from more encompassing ties 
between contingent leaders and their follow-
ers to more circumscribed commercial con-
nections between patrons and clients, reach-
ing a general pattern of indebtedness (see 
Acciaioli 1989, 2000; Ammarell 2002; Vayda 
and Sahur 1985, 1996). For example, as Greg 
Acciaioli points out with respect to patron– 
client relationships in commercial fishing in a 
North Sulawesi Lindu fishing community,
Unlike the wide-ranging obligations 
recognized by more traditional 
punggawa … the bos or pengusaha 
ikan maintains his relations with sub-
ordinate fishermen by one primary 
mechanism: debt. Characteristically an 
operator of a kiosk, he provides daily 
necessities — rice, salt, kerosene, soap, 
etcetera — to a fisherman on credit. But 
the fisherman is then obliged to supply 
only him with the major portion of his 
daily catch (Acciaioli 2000:224–25).
This appears to be the dominant type of 
patron–client system among Bugis abroad, 
including those who settled in the Mahakam 
Delta. The Bugis in the Mahakam Delta 
include punggawa, entrepreneurs who act 
not so much as employers dealing with wage 
earners in the shrimp businesses as they do 
heads and regulators of complex networks of 
dependents, including family and relatives, 
helping their workers cover expenses for 
building a house, medical or other emergency 
expenses, school fees, expenses of ceremo-
nial obligations, and so on.
A recent study by Andrew P. Vayda and 
Ahmad Sahur (1996) indicates that the 
above characterisation of the patron–client 
system also applies to contemporary relations 
between Bugis entrepreneurs and their 
relatives who work for them in sharecropping 
in Teluk Pandan of East Kalimantan. 
The characterisation can be expected 
to apply all the more in the case of 
Teluk Pandan enterprises insofar as 
those regularly working for others in 
Teluk Pandan appear to be mostly their 
poorer and/or younger relatives (Vayda 
and Sahur 1996:16). 
In the Mahakam Delta as well, there is 
a strong preference for having relatives as 
workers. Like some of the Teluk Pandan 
entrepreneurs, punggawa in the delta also 
invoked the following Bugis saying: ‘If 
you have a relative work for you, you are blind 
in only one eye; with a non-relative, you are 
blind in both’ (Vayda and Sahur 1996:16).
In other recent studies of Bugis in frontier 
areas outside their homeland, the increasingly 
modern economic context of the operation 
of leader–follower relations is a recurring 
theme. Acciaioli (1989:172–79) describes the 
generally significant erosion of the totalistic 
nature of patron–client ties among Bugis. The 
increasing impact of direct rule by the Dutch 
East Indies government eliminated the need 
for local leaders to compete for political power. 
The advent of modern capitalism has also 
contributed to the dwindling of many of the 
displays of protection, loyalty, sponsorship, 
and followership that marked patron–client 
relations in the past (Acciaioli 1989:172).
The development of individually claimed 
tracts of land for shrimp ponds in the delta 
appears to have produced a more secular 
and more individualistic patron–client system. 
On top of that, punggawa take from the state 
certain principles for legitimising their role 
as entrepreneurs and ‘service providers’. 
Using largely New Order regime terminology, 
they suggest that they bring government 
(pemerintah) — the most crucial aspect of 
bringing development (pembangunan) — in a 
region where the state fails to do so.
The social fabric among the migrants has 
developed in particular ways upon settle-
  Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier
7
ment in the Mahakam Delta. The punggawa 
as provider of services, insurance company 
and pension fund that Pelras (1996:333) 
observes, functions in the delta as long as 
the aquaculture business supports it. Now, 
with the decrease in shrimp productivity 
combined with the advance of individually 
claimed tracts of land for shrimp ponds has 
produced a rather individualistic patron-client 
system. The punggawa is the intermedi-
ary between the smallholders (owners) and 
keepers of shrimp ponds and the shrimp 
traders or the cold storage plants. Most pung-
gawa lend money to their clients for building 
a home. They also provide money and 
materials for the maintenance of the sluice 
in the discharge channel. These investments 
and related achievements give them status 
and allow them to behave as elites and find 
culturally accepted ways of moving shrimps 
through the delta.
The owner or the small punggawa usually 
puts the baby shrimp in the pond and they 
are also present at harvest time. In the past, 
harvest time was exciting, as harvests would 
generally be good and both the patron and 
his client could begin to count their shares 
in millions of rupiah. The customary profit 
sharing (bagi hasil) is 75 per cent for the 
punggawa and 25 per cent for the anak 
buah (‘bagi empat’) but this catch-sharing 
arrangement may vary and is subject to 
negotiation especially when harvests are 
poor and income for the punggawa appears 
uncertain. Moreover, the negotiations include 
consideration of the debts that are deemed 
necessary to be repaid and subsequently will 
lead to further deduction of the share in the 
profit-sharing agreement.
Nowadays, harvest time comes with 
increased anxiety and stress, as pond produce 
is poor, while the price is lower than ever 
before. A few years ago, people would harvest 
around five times a year and experience at 
worst one poor harvest every year. Nowadays, 
one or two good harvests a year is seen as 
unusual luck. It is in this situation that the 
disparity of wealth between punggawa and 
clients grows with the dependency of the 
latter on the former mounting. Nowadays, to 
minimise risks, the punggawa are reluctant 
to lend money. However, most clients remain 
entangled: they have debts with a patron 
that should be repaid before breaking the 
relationship, and the punggawa have agreed 
among themselves that they will not buy 
shrimps from another punggawa’s anak buah, 
leaving an anak buah with little choice but to 
remain with his patron. 
Besides being in a relationship of debt, 
there is still loyalty that comes from the fact 
that the anak buah has so far relied on the 
help of the punggawa for housing, health 
costs, school fees, and expenses when 
suffering a misfortune such as the death 
of a relative, or when needing to arrange 
and celebrate marriages. Punggawa would 
ideally also take care of ‘retired’ anak buah. 
However, as investors in the region, the big 
punggawa bear little risk even though some 
may have high debts with the cold storage 
plants. This means that when they spot 
opportunities elsewhere they will pull out of 
the delta and leave most of their dependants 
behind in dismay. 
Finding a Culprit For 
deClining shrimp harvests
Do people blame themselves and the ponds 
they operate or is the culprit for the declin-
ing situation to be found elsewhere? I have 
already indicated that there is a tendency 
to blame Total, but to fully understand this it 
is instructive to look at a number of factors, 
including social and economic success and 
social and economic differences. 
A survey conducted in February 2009 
reveals that income inequality is wide, rang-
ing from IDR4 million to estimates of IDR1 
billion to IDR1.5 billion (about AUD$275 to 
AUD$68,000 to AUD$103,000) per year.3 
The higher numbers are estimates by the 
financial assistants of punggawa, who stress 
that their bookkeeping is sloppy and merely 
account expenses and earnings.4 Many also 
try their luck in gambling. 
Overall, incomes tends to rise and drop 
rapidly because, revenue-wise, most are 
largely dependent on aquaculture and fish-
ing. These activities both experience quick 
and significant price changes due to unstable 
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international markets and changes in the 
rate of the Indonesian rupiah against the US 
dollar. This dependence on aquaculture also 
makes people vulnerable to the effects of 
exhaustion of ponds.
Because of this context, the decline of 
shrimp harvests has had a devastating impact. 
This has led the poor and vulnerable shrimp 
farmers in the Mahakam Delta to complain or 
express grievances about the environmental 
pollution that they believe has inflicted the 
misfortune. In particular, pollution is believed 
to reduce the productivity of shrimp ponds 
(sometimes to zero) and the subsequent 
action of making a charge or even a claim is 
directed towards Total. This is, however, hard 
to prove for local people because they do not 
have access to the equipment and facilities 
needed to scientifically establish these links. 
At the same time, the immediate link people 
establish between Total and shrimp demise 
neglects other factors like shrimp diseases, 
or ‘natural’ exhaustion due to the shrimp 
production system exceeding the carrying 
capacity of its natural environment. 
In other words, the risks related to shrimp 
farming feature less prominently in people’s 
awareness than the normative frameworks 
that potentially offer redress for grievances 
that point to the wrongs of others as the 
cause of decreased productivity. Besides 
blaming Total, they also blame the gov-
ernment for having allowed the excessive 
expansion of ponds in the delta through lack 
of regulation and by stimulating production. 
Many argue that if the digging of ponds had 
been regulated initially there would be less 
crowding and competition and farming would 
be more productive as a result. 
With respect to teachings about production 
enhancement, people are at loss about advice 
from the department of fishery to make man-
grove-clean ponds (that are prone to exhaus-
tion) and the use of certain kinds of feedstuffs 
(that increase the risk of shrimp diseases). 
Less immediately related to shrimp farming, 
people see that in general the government 
takes little responsibility for the people and 
the environment. Most concretely, the gov-
ernment does not compensate for losses and 
damages. In comparison to the government, 
people see that Total provides aid to villages 
and compensates for losses although not 
always according to people’s expectations.
Another problem faced by the shrimp 
farmers is that people see that their ponds 
regularly flood, likely because of a rising sea 
level, but according to the people, it is due 
to Total’s drilling activity causing the land to 
sink. This observation is linked to anxiety 
caused by an increasing number of oil and 
gas platforms encroaching on their land and 
waters. Total is drilling increasingly more 
wells in what is known as the Mahakam 
Block. Angular, brightly coloured and firmly 
guarded offshore platforms mark the horizon 
of the sea, while pipes cutting through the 
land connect regulating units and plants. 
And there is an increasing amount of traffic 
associated with the production of oil and gas. 
Overall, people feel besieged by an industry 
over which they have no control. 
The 2009 survey indicates a strong corre-
lation between proximity to Total installations 
and the level of knowledge about company 
and state regulations (while education and 
income levels are the same). That is, people 
who have experienced the effects of seismic 
exploration and gas and oil drilling in the 
vicinity of their shrimp pond or in their fishing 
grounds are more aware of certain company 
and state regulations (see below). It is, there-
fore, no surprise that people living close to 
installations of the oil and gas company are 
more inclined to voice grievances towards 
that company. They blame Total’s activities 
for reducing the productivity of their ponds 
due to pollution and geographic disturbances 
and demand the government take responsi-
bility. It is also their perception of the natural 
environment that inclines them to do so.
The natural environment is a shared 
concern of many because it is crucial to their 
livelihoods. The aquaculturists see the delta 
as a commodity frontier in which they see 
themselves as ‘super-natural’ (above nature). 
To understand issues of access to justice 
related to the environment it is important 
to understand the cultural backdrop. For 
example, people tend to reason that if Total 
is allowed to exploit natural resources to 
the detriment of the natural environment, 
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then the people should be allowed to do 
the same. If Total hinders free access to 
land for ponds and waters for fish and 
limits successful harvesting of shrimp then it 
should compensate the people as an equal 
economic competitor in the Mahakam Delta 
frontier. Total and the people are considered 
equal actors in a frontier of entrepreneurial 
and capitalist exploitation. That Total thinks 
differently and may not always play the game 
according to Bugis’s frontier culture leads to 
resentment.
The identification of blame is also 
grounded in people’s awareness of laws 
and regulations. People learn about laws 
and regulations by experience, stories from 
others, and from explanations disclosed 
during information-cum-counselling sessions 
(penyuluhan or sosialisasi) by the state 
and the company. State law and company 
regulations are, according to most, in 
principle capable of providing justice for all 
and enabling the delta to be managed in such 
a way that all would benefit from its wealth. 
Claiming Compensation For 
deClining shrimp harvests
This section details the evolution of the 
Sungai Banjar case and discusses the way 
in which people bring allegations to forums 
and the kind of redress obtained. Fear, 
uncertainty, hampered communication, 
intermediaries, and self-interest play a major 
role. Self-interest is not only part of the 
frontier culture sketched above, but also 
emerges forcefully in the context of declining 
harvests, increasing economic hardship, and 
the absence of meaningful development from 
the state. Self-interest as part of the frontier 
culture of the shrimp pond workers relates to 
survival of the individual man and his family 
on the basis of the investment made and the 
venture developed in the frontier. 
As of the year 2000, a number of people 
in Sungai Banjar began to suspect pollution 
of their shrimp ponds. They saw that one of 
the pipes of the Total platform named GTS 
TN 10 Charlie (henceforth: Platform Charlie) 
was leaking gas. Platform Charlie is situated 
about 300 meters from the shore of Sungai 
Banjar, where the shrimp ponds begin. 
Fishermen saw a massive stream of gas 
bubbling up to the surface. This is continued 
at least until my last field visit in mid-2009. 
The surrounding water has a brown-yellowish 
colour, arousing suspicion and fear about 
environmental pollution. 
Around the same time, the shrimp farmers 
of Sungai Banjar began to face increasingly 
severe declines in their shrimp harvests. 
In combination with the observation that 
Total must be the cause of this decline, 
they seemingly began to overcome frontier 
individualism. What united people was 
the realisation that organising themselves 
collectively may facilitate easier access to 
compensation money. 
It took, however, until 2005, for people 
to establish the so-called Kelompok Petani 
Tambak Mulai Maju (Group of Shrimp Pond 
Farmers Commencing Progress) for claiming 
compensation from Total. The main driving 
force behind the establishment of Mulai Maju 
was Syaiful Kanibua, a lawyer based in 
Samarinda, who was invited to assess the 
situation in Sungai Banjar. Kanibua promised 
to be able to arrange compensation for 
environmental pollution if evidence could 
be established. He also told people to unite 
when voicing their concern. 
Soon after Kanibua came on the scene, 
the number of members of Mulai Maju 
increased to 79, covering almost all shrimp 
farmers in Sungai Banjar. Many initially 
expected to benefit from the concerted 
action in relation to the assistance offered 
by Kanibua. They were soon to find out, 
though, that Kanibua’s promises would not 
materialise as quickly as hoped. Those who 
were disillusioned quit the organisation and 
currently believe it is unlikely their financial 
contribution to Kanibua will be repaid, let 
alone receiving compensation. They have 
also become wary of outsiders who promise 
to assist in seeking redress through courts, 
negotiations, or lobbying.
In the beginning, Kanibua planned to focus 
the case around pollution due to seismic 
activity but, following discussions with Pak 
Amiruddin, the claim began to focus on 
the leaking pipe. According to the stories I 
Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier
10
collected, upon the advice of Kanibua some 
shrimp farmers began to gather evidence 
from their shrimp ponds in the form of 
photographs and camera footage (usually 
with 1–2 megapixel mobile phone cameras). 
The photos show dead shrimp and the video 
footage gas bubbling up from the leaking pipe 
of Platform Charlie. 
Again following advice of Kanibua, the 
members of Mulai Maju agreed upon a finan-
cial compensation of IDR15 million (about 
AUD$1,800) per family, but Kanibua swiftly 
raised it to IDR60 million (about AUD$6,100) 
per family. People were happy to agree, and 
on the basis of discussions with Mulai Maju, 
Amiruddin, Sungai Banjar’s sub-village head 
(Bapak RT) and apparently also with the 
village head of the village of Sepatin, Pak 
Thamrin, Kanibua moved the case upward 
to the district parliament Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) of Kutai Kartanegara. 
He told the people that this step would bring 
them close to redress as Kanibua is well con-
nected to a member of the DPRD named Pak 
Marwan.
The immediate result of Kanibua’s efforts 
is that an official team went to the village 
to collect water samples from the shrimp 
ponds. The team included officials from the 
Environmental Monitoring Board (Badan 
Pengawas Dampak Lingkungan Hidup) of the 
Regional Planning Bureau (Bappedalda), and 
Total. The attention of some highly positioned 
officials made the members of Mulai Maju 
hopeful that their claims would be accepted. 
Others reasoned that this may be an 
attempt by Total to wash its hands by proving 
to the government and the people that there 
is no environmental pollution. The water sam-
ple was taken to the laboratory of the Pusat 
Pendidikan Lingkungan Hidup at Universitas 
Maluwarman in the city of Samarinda. The 
results of their investigation indicated that 
there was no evidence of pollution. However, 
this did not discourage Kanibua and Marwan. 
They continued to claim compensation. 
People told me that at a certain stage 
Total made an attempt to negotiate with 
Kanibua a settlement of the case with a 
compensation payment worth less than the 
claim. Kanibua did not enter the negotiations, 
arguing that he was merely representing 
the people who considered only the original 
claim just. Apparently, and according to local 
narratives, Total began to perceive Kanibua 
as a profiteer. In the end, Total no longer dealt 
with Kanibua and decided to pay IDR150 
million to the people through one of its 
Community Development funds. But people 
allegedly received only IDR70 million, which 
had to be shared among 79 shrimp farmers. 
Seventy families received IDR1 million (about 
AUD$120) each and nine families did not 
receive anything. 
The kind of redress advocated by Kanibua 
and agreed upon by the shrimp farmers leads 
to distress. A potentially rewarding road to 
justice proved to be ineffective. The company 
handed out cash money to the claimants but 
this did not provide redress. Instead, as the 
amount was so little and nine families did 
not receive money, resentment towards Total 
grew. ‘This is not how one does business in 
the delta, not with Bugis,’ is how a woman 
expressed her anger. 
To approach the company is not easy as 
its offices are in Balikpapan and further afield 
in Jakarta and Paris. This largely explains 
why they were keen to trust a mediator like 
Kanibua and strengthen themselves as a 
group with similar concerns, despite a frontier 
culture that encourages them not to work 
together. Previously, people tended to report 
their concerns about environmental pollution 
and declining harvests to Amiruddin, Sungai 
Banjar’s sub-village head. They were vesting 
their hopes in him to process their complaints 
to a higher state forum. However, Pak Amirud-
din and also other elements in the village 
government (aparat desa) did not respond as 
effectively as expected by the justice seekers. 
Disappointed, people reasoned that if the 
lowest level of government felt that there is 
no reason to advocate their concern to higher 
levels of the state, then those higher levels 
might disparage them. Having departed from 
a level they would describe as buta hukum 
(legally illiterate), they now felt let down by 
what they considered the only and the most 
powerful forum: the state. Many realise that 
this is part of the game of living frontier lives 
and as a result most do not complain much 
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but instead try to seek alternatives. These 
alternatives include petty business, catching 
small shrimp, producing and selling shrimp 
crackers, or moving to another region. The 
latter option is only available to those who 
have enough money to invest in a new 
venture. It is in this situation that most try to 
get what is potentially available, including 
compensation money from Total.
In terms of legal awareness, it is important 
to note that people realise the potential 
benefits of engaging with a lawyer, in particular 
with someone who is connected to people in 
the DPRD. The DPRD is an influential body 
nowadays. In the past, DPRDs were seen 
as rubber stamps of the central government 
but decentralisation has brought functions to 
the regions that have greatly increased its 
powers. The DPRD not only makes local rules 
and regulations Peraturan Daerah (PERDA) 
but also oversees and monitors the role of 
local governments. Law 32/2004 states that 
DPRDs have the obligation and authority 
to conduct oversight of implementation of 
PERDA and other regulations, decisions of 
governor regents/mayors, implementation of 
local budgets, local executive policy and 
implementation with respect to international 
cooperation in the region. The DPRD can 
play a role in settling conflicts between 
foreign companies and local communities. 
Realising the authority of the DPRD has 
likely encouraged Total to look seriously into 
accusations of environmental pollution and 
actively join government teams investigating 
situations on the ground. The Sungai Banjar 
case has increased awareness about the 
present role of the DPRD. This may provide 
others with the incentive to push the DPRD to 
act on complaints and grievances expressed 
by their constituents with respect to local 
policies and the quality of public services.
the Failure to implement 
government regulations
Until today the government has failed to 
control the situation in the delta so as to 
foster the sustainable development of 
resources that would benefit everyone. The 
main reason behind this failure is lack of 
interest, not the absence of regulations. 
Most of the previous studies on nature and 
development in the delta indicate that more 
or less proper regulations are in place and 
should in fact have prevented massive 
destruction of mangrove forests. But due to 
the failure of policies the delta has become 
the stage for a typical drama of the commons. 
Below I detail the history and evolution of 
official regulations and show that lack of state 
intervention has allowed this drama to evolve 
(see also Simarmata 2010). 
Since the late 1960s, control of the delta’s 
mineral resources were given to the national 
oil company Pertamina. The postcolonial gov-
ernment gazetted it as a Mining Conces-
sion Region or Wilayah Kuasa Pertambangan 
(WKP) comprising the Mahakam gas and oil 
fields — an area covering about 95 per cent 
of the estuary of the Mahakam River. With 
respect to land and natural environment, this 
concession demands that companies operat-
ing in that area should conduct a baseline 
environmental assessment as a precondition 
for permit granting. Furthermore, the com-
pany is obliged to protect the ecosystem, and 
prevent environmental pollution. 
The Oil and Gas Act of 1960, the Mining 
Act of 1967 and a Presidential Decree of 
1976 detail that oil and gas companies 
are not obliged to obtain right to land 
for their exploitation activities. They only 
need to compensate for land taken from 
local landowners, with the provision that 
compensation does not transfer rights to the 
company. After mining has ceased, the land 
should be returned to the original landowner, 
in most cases the state. 
Recently, related regulations that were put 
in place at the time when Total was already 
extracting oil and gas in the region, outline 
that all land compensated by the company 
is expropriated to eventually become state 
land. This is ruled in a Government Regula-
tion (Peraturan Pemerintah) of 2004 and in 
a Decree of the Head of the Oil and Gas 
Agency (BPMIGAS) of 2007. In addition to 
these two regulations, there are rules that 
say that landowners have to allow mining 
activities on their land by parties who can 
produce evidence of being a WKP conces-
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sionaire or its contractor. 
For the shrimp farmers, these regulations 
impact most significantly on the issue of 
who receives compensation and who does 
not. Confusion about this arises because 
the regulations are not clear about who has 
the right to be compensated. From a legal 
perspective, Total paying compensation to 
the pond owners who do not possess a land 
certificate is illegal. The ponds are illegal as 
they exist without any permit from forestry 
minister, governor, regent or the forestry 
agencies. A significant amount of ponds are 
also illegal because they are located within a 
protected zone.5 
The provincial land-use planning agency 
declared the Mahakam Delta a protected 
zone in 1999 and the only legal ponds are 
those for which the owners have a land cer-
tificate — a total of only five percent of the 
landmass of the delta. None of the newcom-
ers hold land certificates and feel no need for 
more legal certainty. They are sure that, when 
needed, they can sell or let the land, and in 
case the government wants to evict them, 
it will certainly pay compensation. Indeed, 
many farmers hope that Total will dispossess 
them so that they can collect a relatively high 
amount of compensation money for the land 
that is becoming increasingly unproductive. 
This will enable them to invest the money 
elsewhere.
If the legal status of the Mahakam Delta 
is a forest zone Total should secure permits 
before cutting mangrove. This is not happen-
ing. As a coastal region, the Mahakam Delta 
is a protected area where aquaculture and 
land registration for cultivation and settle-
ments by the village governments are not 
allowed. If all these legal provisions had been 
implemented the delta would likely still look 
like it did some three decades ago. What 
went wrong?
Since the process of devolution of 
government power that commenced shortly 
after the fall of the Suharto regime, the 
regional level has become increasingly 
responsible for regulating extraction of natural 
resources. However, there appears to be a 
lack of political will to develop policy that may 
stimulate sustainable development of natural 
resources. There are a number of reasons 
for this. The first has to do with a tradition or 
legacy of colonial policies relating to natural 
resource management. 
Until the end of the nineteenth century 
there was little interest in the natural 
resources of the delta. The Kutai sultanate 
appeared to be unaware of a few small 
groups of settlers on the islands in the 
delta. These were mostly Bugis engaged in 
fishing and gardening (including coconuts) 
as well as trade with groups upstream the 
Mahakam River. The Kutai sultanate was 
more interested in levying taxes on trade of 
forest products from upstream Dayak groups 
to seafaring traders. 
Next, the colonial government focussed 
heavily on resource exploitation and largely 
denied resource rights to local populations, 
let alone in sparsely populated areas like the 
Mahakam River Delta. The main resource 
extraction activity in that period was in the 
hands of capitalist ventures (then owned by 
Dutch). This practice continued after indepen-
dence when the government faced the chal-
lenge of state building and chose to use struc-
tures left over from the former colonial power. 
The ownership and management of 
resources for the local people were often not 
clear. Additionally, political elites did not have 
much trust in the state as its structure and 
ideology often changed during the republic’s 
first two decades. As a result, they sought to 
maximise personal benefits and did not put 
much effort in establishing credible govern-
ment structures. 
The third reason is of particular impor-
tance to the situation in the delta, namely 
the nature of shrimp markets and the inter-
national system of resource use with respect 
to oil and gas. International trade in shrimp 
and the transnational oil and gas industry is 
largely skewed against regions such as East 
Kalimantan with plentiful natural resources. 
ConClusion 
The case of environmental pollution near 
Sungai Banjar shows how small-scale 
shrimp farmers try to hold the oil and gas 
industry responsible for declining produc-
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tivity of their shrimp ponds. Since approxi-
mately 2002, shrimp harvests have declined 
across the delta. Concurrently, access to 
and control over social and natural resourc-
es have become tenuous. At the same time, 
the presence and impact of Total’s gas and 
oil operations is growing and the prospect of 
receiving compensation payments for envi-
ronmental damage has become popular. In 
this situation, a group of shrimp farmers in 
Sungai Banjar have come to see themselves 
as victims of supposedly toxic gas leaks 
from pipes of Total installations. They link 
the pollution to the end of their autonomy 
and the ordeal of moving on to a new region 
and starting anew as opportunistic migrants 
— an undertaking almost no-one can afford.
People in the Mahakam Delta are hardly 
motivated to develop their region for the 
common good. They see their activities 
and themselves as above nature and they 
are keen to remain autonomous from the 
state and other institutional frameworks. As 
a result, the recent hardships of settlers 
residing in the Mahakam Delta resulting 
from the decline in shrimp harvests does 
not necessarily translate into care for an 
environment that is allegedly destroyed by 
the oil and gas ventures of Total.
In this context, sustainability is not on peo-
ple’s minds, the focus is on sharing wealth. 
The punggawa think differently about sharing, 
and claim a larger share as they feel that they 
are like the state in terms of providing money 
and welfare to the people (their clients). They 
tend to think that the state provides uncer-
tainty due to unclear and ever-changing plans 
and programs and its own interest in oil and 
gas exploitation in the delta. In many respects, 
Bugis’s ideas about ‘rights’ to access to state 
services and company compensations are pit-
ted against their supposedly inherent frontier 
self-reliance. As a result, Bugis’s demands for 
justice do not contribute to a demand from for-
mal institutions that may improve governance 
for the benefit of all or for the protection of the 
natural environment.
In this context the ‘justice’ of environmental 
justice is best understood as an ambiguous 
concept; in particular, varying claims about 
injustice appear to be attempts at trying to get 
compensation from the oil and gas company 
for the decline of shrimp harvests. This kind 
of modern self-interest evolves when people’s 
economic ventures are no longer productive. 
It appears to be the result of a realistic view 
that relates to development and compensa-
tion promises by the company, and, to a much 
lesser extent, the government.
People know that representatives of 
the government and Total come and make 
promises about financial rewards, bridges, 
restoration of nature, saving the delta and 
so on, which are unlikely to be sustainable. 
In these circumstances, people in the delta 
have a realistic view to get what they can, 
while they can. Hence, what is often seen as 
opportunism or greed is a response to the 
failure of the frontier as a productive zone 
and the failure of government policies to 
effectively regulate development. 
In a coastal region that is abundantly rich 
in natural resources, where people do not 
share equally in the profits of shrimp ponds, 
fishing and other resource extraction, this 
kind of response is understandable. In other 
words, mounting claims for compensation 
presented to Total is not merely a condition 
created by the migrants or Total, but a condi-
tion that offers opportunities for people who 
know how to gain access to that particular 
kind of justice.
Policy action with respect to coastal 
shrimp frontiers should focus on outlining 
arrangements for controlling access for and 
the pace of scale of small-scale resource 
projects so as to ensure sustainable devel-
opment. Regulation with respect to pollution 
should focus around compensation for dam-
ages that can actually be proven. 
Any consideration of compensation should 
take into account past investments of the 
victim related to the amount of land or 
waters used and the size of the land or 
waters polluted. This is the reality that people 
in the delta are all too familiar with and 
which informs much of their understanding 
of current injustices. At the same time, one 
should realise that the absence of clear 
regulation about land ownership leads to 
confusion, tension, and claims that are hard 
to assess. 
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To effectively engage with the kind of 
frontier civil society that I have identified 
here, it is important to acknowledge the 
extent to which social organisation and 
people’s attitude towards the state and 
companies is shaped by the long-term 
absence of the state and the prevalent 
local patron–client relations. In order to 
deal with the environmental degradation in 
the area, suitable mechanisms of dialogue 
are needed to ensure a smooth interface 
between all stakeholders — from villagers 
and village heads to punggawa, money-
lenders and company representatives — to 
ensure sustainable development of natural 
resources and justice for the most vulnerable.
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endnotes
1. To protect the identity of my informants 
I use pseudonyms when referring to them 
and I have fictionalised any contextual 
clues to their identity.
2. Total is the Indonesian upstream unit of 
Franco-Belgian TotalFinaElf SA. It has 
been present in Indonesia since 1968, 
and is the country’s leading gas producer. 
Total has been active in the Mahakam 
region since the early 1970s; production 
has been growing ever since, in particular 
with the discovery of massive fields in the 
late 1990s. The production in and offshore 
the delta now supplies most of the feed gas 
for the Bontang liquefaction plant from the 
so-called Mahakam Block. The Mahakam 
Block is also a top-tier oil and condensate 
producer.
3. These numbers are consistent with the 
findings of a household survey reported 
by Bourgeois et al. (2002: 57–58). Other 
data from the survey also largely concur 
with their socioeconomic and institutional 
analysis of Mahakam Delta stakeholders. 
Moreover, the results of the survey echo 
issues in other tropical coastal regions 
where aquaculture and fishing are the 
main economic activities (see, for example, 
Stonich and Vandergeest, 2001). The 
presence of oil and gas mining in the 
Mahakam Delta adds a number of different 
problems that are detailed in this paper 
(and see Timmer 2010).
4. The Banjar fishermen who live on trawlers 
for extensive periods of time (for periods 
of up to three months) are generally better 
off. Pedagang or traders and shop and food 
stall entrepreneurs comprise a middle class 
of a sort. Also living in the villages are blue-
collar employees of Total holding mostly 
fixed-term contracts (ranging from one day, 
one week to three months, but rarely to one 
year). These are mostly younger men and 
generally sons of fishermen who rank at the 
lowest economic level.
5. Since the Mahakan Delta is a coastal 
region, it is also subject to the so-called 
Joint Forestry and Agricultural Ministerial 
Decree of 1984, which outlines regulations 
for aquaculture in coastal forest (man-
grove). This decree prohibits aquaculture 
on land masses (islands) smaller than ten 
square kilometres. For the delta, almost all 
its islands belonging to that category have 
become home to aquaculture and thus 
have little forest left. On top of that, a Presi-
dential Decree of 1990 — the so-called 
organic regulation of the Environmental 
Law of 1982 — aims to prevent environ-
mental damage in coastal and mangrove 
environments. 
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